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A three-sector macro model of the Chinese economy is developed in which the
activity of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is constrained by the state-imposed
credit plan for working capital.  Our analysis indicates the weaknesses of credit
control and nominal interest rate increases as tools for holding down the price
level; but the hardening of SOEs’ budget constraints is found to be an effective
device. The existence of credit and currency controls tends to make
devaluation contractionary.  Because of general equilibrium repercussions,
policies that boost industrial exports tend to reduce welfare in the agricultural
sector, where poverty is concentrated.
JEL Classification Numbers: 011, 023, P21
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the ESRC Money, Macro and
Finance Research Group half-day conference on Money, Macroeconomics and
Finance in China (London, 14 March 1997). The authors are grateful to Eric
Girardin and the participants for very helpful comments.1
Monetary Policy and Credit in China:  a Theoretical Analysis
The  development of substantial elements of a market system in the real sector in China
over  the past two decades has been accompanied by a tendency to high inflation, which the
authorities  have combatted primarily by monetary policy.
1  However, commercial banking in
China, which is dominated by four large state-owned banks, remains subject to the type of
controls  associated with central planning, with the main instrument of monetary control being the
quantitative  regulation of credit via the “credit plan”.
2  The PBC formulates the credit plan with
the  active collaboration of the Ministry of Finance and the State Planning Commission (SPC).
As  a result particularly of the participation of the SPC, the credit plan is not only the main method
of   control of the money supply; it is also a means by which more microeconomic objectives are
pursued.   Detailed priorities are set for “policy lending”, which, in some cases, is even specified
at  the level of the individual borrower.  In part, policy lending is employed to support chosen
growth  sectors, but it is also used to underpin loss-making SOEs.  Consequently, a large
proportion  of bank loans are non-performing.
3   Many  loans are effectively subsidies extended under
government  direction (blurring the distinction between monetary and fiscal policy), while often
the banks  themselves concede parts of loans to ensure SOEs’ survival (World Bank, 1996; Zou
and Sin, 1996).
In  this paper we focus on the role of working capital, which is a particularly important
component  of the credit plan, being a priority item (Montes-Negret, 1995) and constituting about
60%  of planned loans (World Bank, 1996).  We develop a three-sector model in which agriculture
is  modelled as a single sector, but industry is split into two sectors, which produce a non-traded
good  and an export good, respectively.
4   For simplicity, the non-traded industrial good producing
sector  is assumed to be composed entirely of SOEs, for whom output is constrained by the
availability  of credit for working capital.
5  Also, we allow for SOEs having soft budget2
constraints, by  assuming that a portion of the loans in this sector is not repaid to the banks.  In
contrast, the export sector is treated as facing no limits on the availability of  credit for working
capital.   This is intended as a stylized representation of the priority that is given to exports in the
credit  plan (Montes-Negret, 1995).  However, during periods of severe credit tightening, the
difficulties  encountered by SOEs have led the authorities to override other priorities and give the
SOEs a larger proportion of the  credit available.
6  We therefore also modify the model to allow
for credit rationing to the export  sector.  Throughout,  the simplifying assumption is made that
agriculture has no working capital needs. 
Because of  the complex mix of plan and market in China and the variety of institutional
forms  under which production takes place, any stylized model of the Chinese economy should be
treated  with caution.  Nonetheless, we believe that our analysis indicates the importance of
attempting  to model the specific features of the Chinese economy,  for we obtain results about
the  effects of monetary policy that are quite different to those obtaining in a free-market economy.
We find that credit controls have an effect on the aggregate price level that can take either sign,
while  an increase in the nominal interest rate leads to a higher aggregate price level.  Furthermore,
monetary  expansion (in the sense of greater initial money balances for households) has an overall
contractionary effect  on output.  A similar conclusion may apply for devaluation.  These results
are  due to the general equilibrium repercussions of the credit plan and the control of foreign
currency.
In  Section 1 we set up the basic model.  In Section 2 we characterize the macroeconomic
equilibrium,  while in Section 3 we examine various policy changes.  We pay particular attention
to  variation of the credit plan, and we go on to consider a change in the nominal interest rate and
a hardening of the budget constraint for SOEs.  We also look at various other policy charges,
including  devaluation.  In Section 4 we consider briefly the effect of the imposition of credit




Our  formulation of the utility function is similar to that of Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987),
and  Ball and Romer (1990), amongst others.
7     We consider a single period, for which any
household  h has the utility function
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industrial  good, respectively;   is its terminal money holding and   is the amount  of time it Mh Nh
spends  working.    is the cost-of-living index associated with the Cobb-Douglas sub-utility P
function in goods:





where     and   are  the respective money prices of food and the non-traded industrial good. pF pQ
 in eq.(1) is  h’s average (= marginal) propensity to consume. c
We shall consider three types of household, using the subscripts    for a household h’F, Q, X
working  in the agricultural, non-traded industrial good and export sectors, respectively.  We
define  imputed income   as initial money holding   plus the relevant measure of  h’s  earnings. yh M
o
h
This  measure will be defined separately below for each of  .   The budget constraint facing h’F, Q, X
h is
(3) pFFh%pQQh%Mh # yh, h’F, Q, X
Maximising   w.r.t. (3) yields uh
Fh ’ á cyh/ pF
(4) h’F, Q, X
Qh ’ ( 1 &á ) cyh/ PQ4
The Agricultural Sector
The  disadvantages associated with migration confine the number of households in the
agricultural  sector to  .
8  The representative household in this sector produces an amount of LF
food   according to the production function AF
(5) AF ’ N
a
F, 0 <a<1
The  household retains the amount of food   for its own consumption (by assumption,  ); FF FF<AF
but its imputed income   includes the entire market value of its output: yF
(6) yF ’ M
o
F%pFAF
The  agricultural household is a price-taker; both   and   are market-clearing.  Given (2), (3), pF pQ
(5) and (6), its utility-maximizing input of labour time is
(7) NF ’ a
pF
pQ
1 &á 1 / ( ä &á )
 is increasing in the terms of trade  .    and   then follow from (3)-(6). NF pF/ pQ AF,FF,QF yF
The Non-Traded Industrial Good Sector
This  sector consists of SOEs.
9  In modelling the representative SOE we wish to highlight
three  particular factors.  The first is that SOEs in practice have operated with a rate of disguised
unemployment  reported to be 15-20% (Hussain, 1992; World Bank, 1997).  Second, we want to
show  the dependence of SOEs on the credit plan, in particular for working capital.  Third, we
wish  to represent the failure of SOEs to honour their full debt obligations (this is associated with
the  soft budget constraint).  We therefore model the representative SOE as having a
parametrically  fixed number of employees  ,
10   where   exceeds current production needs. LQ LQ
The SOE  produces output  Q and uses   of an imported intermediate.  Its production function IQ
is  Leontief, where,  for consistency of our formulation across all three sectors, we assume that5
there are diminishing returns in the labour contribution:
(8) Q ’ min ( L
â
Q,IQ) , 0 <â <1
The  credit plan specifies that working capital up to the amount   may be  advanced to MQ
the  SOE at the nominal interest rate  r.   As will become clear from our formulation of SOE worker
income,  the SOE will always choose to borrow the full amount available.  Also, we assume that  MQ
is used entirely to buy intermediates, rather than  any of it being distributed directly to workers.
(The  case of direct distribution of part of   is already captured in the model, for it is equivalent MQ
to  a higher level of the initial household money holding  .  We return to this  issue in Section M
o
Q
4.)  Hence, as there is surplus labour in the firm,
(9) L
â
Q > Q ’ IQ ’ MQ/ pI
The  managers of SOEs in practice tend to collude with their labour force to avoid
centrally-imposed  restrictions on wage scales (see Hussain and Stern, 1991; Qian, 1995).  Given,
also,  that, with all households possessing utility function (1), changes in the distribution across
households  of a given total income have no effects on goods demands, little is therefore lost if we
model  the representative SOE as distributing to its workforce all of its net revenue.  In calculating
this  net revenue, however, we take into account that the SOE only honours the proportion   of ö
its debt,  .  Thus, each employee receives ( 1 %r) MQ
(10) WQ ’ 1
LQ
pQQ&ö ( 1 %r) MQ&TQ, 0 #ö #1
where   is the tax paid by the SOE.  Substituting from (8) and (9) into (10), TQ
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We assume that the firm is a price-taker;   is market-clearing.
11   For simplicity, we  treat   as pQ ö
constant, a larger   implying a harder  budget constraint.  The microeconomic and institutional ö
factors  that determine the hardness of the budget constraint are beyond the scope of this paper.
12
Finally, imputed income for   is simply h’Q6
(12) yQ ’ M
o
Q%WQ
The  Q-household maximizes   subject to (12), treating   as a parameter. uQ WQ
The Export Sector
China’s  exports come from enterprises of various institutional forms, including township
and  village enterprises (TVEs), joint ventures and more profit-oriented SOEs.  In all these
enterprises  it is generally easier to fire workers than it is in traditional SOEs.
13   We therefore
model  the representative export sector firm as choosing freely its purchase of the services of  LX
workers  at the going wage.  Also, since, in practice, priority is given to exporters in the credit
plan,  we assume that the amount of working capital   that the firm can borrow is MX
unconstrained.   This working capital is used to purchase   of imported intermediates.
14   The firm IX
produces output  X according to the production function
15
(13) X ’ min ( L
b
X, IX) , 0 <b<1
As there are no binding constraints on its behaviour,
(14) L
b
X ’ X ’ IX ’ MX/ pI
Since  the bad debt problem in China is largely confined to traditional SOEs, we make the
simplifying assumption  that the export sector firm always repays its debt fully.  After-tax profit
is  hence  ,  where   is the unit price of exports in domestic ÐX ’ pXX&WXLX&pIIX&rMX&TX pX
currency,    is the market wage rate (in nominal terms) and   is the amount of tax paid by the WX TX
firm.  Using (14), we therefore have
(15) ÐX ’ pX&( 1 %r) pI L
b
X&WXLX&TX
Maximising (15) with respect to  , given that   , yields LX pX&( 1 %r) pI >0
(16) LX ’




Given the utility function (1), the identity of the recipients of   is of no significance for the ÐX7
macro  equilibrium, provided that all of   goes to domestic residents.
16   For simplicity, we ÐX
assume  that    is shared equally between the   workers in the firm.  Thus, imputed income is ÐX LX
(17) yX ’ M
o
X%WX%ÐX/ LX
Each employee is assumed to treat   as a parameter. ÐX/ LX
The Labour Market
Open  unemployment is  ,   where  H de notes the total number of U’H&LF&LQ&LX
households.   We treat both   and as given, whereas   is determined in a competitive labour LF LQ LX
market.  The rationale for this assumption is  the existence in China of a ‘floating population’ of
100-150m.  wandering in search of work (Sachs and Woo, 1997).  Normalizing the number of
hours  in the work period in the  X sector to unity,   in eq.(1), and so the disutility of working NX’1
for  the day is  .   Assuming that  ,  the real wage for the work period is driven down to this 1 / ä U>0
disutility:
(18) WX/ P ’ 1 / ä
International Trade
China’s  foreign  exchange system has now reached an unprecedented uniformity (Boke,
1996)  and so we assume that imports of the intermediate,  ,  and exports,  X,  occur at world IQ%IX








(19) pX ’ ep
(
X
At  the same time, China retains a complex import control system, with the main priority being
imports  of inputs.  Recently, however, there has been a shift in the composition of imports toward
food, reflecting the government’s desire to reduce the pressure on food prices (World Bank,
1996).
17   The government pays the foreign currency world unit price   for food and then p
(
F8
releases  it on to the domestic market.  Since the government’s active control of domestic goods
prices  has declined substantially in the 1990s, we assume that the domestic food price    is pF
market-clearing; the  injection of imports of food by the government is merely a rightward shift
in the supply curve.
National Income Accounts
We reflect China’s import  management system by assuming that the balance of trade in
foreign  currency,  , is a policy parameter.  We have already specified   and  X as B ( IQ,IX
endogenous,  but we now further assume that the government allows in imports of food  A M
insofar as the balance of trade constraint allows.  We therefore have









where    is determined as a residual, which we assume throughout is positive.
18     We define the A M
nominal budget deficit as
(21) D ’ &T%( ep
(
F&pF) A
M&6rMX%[ 1 &ö ( 1 %r) ] MQ>




government buying at the foreign currency world price   and selling domestically at  .  The p
(
F pF
term  in curly brackets, the profit of the commercial banking sector (which may be negative), is
included  because commercial banking is not so much an industry as an arm of government in
China.
19   Its inclusion makes our definition of  D close to what is known as the ‘consolidated
government deficit’.  Since money creation has been the main form of financing of the
consolidated  government deficit in practice (Clutterbuck, 1992; World Bank, 1995), we make the
simplifying assumption that  D is financed entirely by money creation.
Let   Y denote nominal national income.  Using the fact that, from (1),  c is the average
propensity to consume, standard manipulations now yield
(22) Y ’ c
1 &c
( M o%D) %B9








expenditure  process.  Note that  Y depends only on policy parameters, not on what happens to
prices and quantities.
Using  the Cobb-Douglas subutility function (see eq.(1)), aggregate household expenditure
 divides between food and the non-traded industrial good in the proportions   and , c( Y%M o) á 1 &á
respectively.  Thus,
pF F d ’ á c( Y%M o)
(23)
pQQ d ’ ( 1 &á ) c( Y%M o)
where     is total food demand and   is the total F d/LFFF%LQFQ%LXFX Q d/LFQF%LQQQ%LXQX
demand for non-traded goods.
2. MACROECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM
Given  that the markets for food, non-traded industrial goods and export sector labour all
clear, the equilibrium for this system can be expressed in three equations.  First, we take the
market-clearing  condition for food,  ,  and, using (5), (7), (9), (14), (19), (20) F d&LFAF&A M’0
and (23), we obtain




















Similarly,  for the non-traded industrial good, we substitute into   from (9), (19) and (23), Q d&Q’0
yielding









Finally, for the labour market in the export sector, we use (2), (14), (16) and (18) to obtain
(26) be[ p
(












There  are three endogenous variables in (24)-(26):   and  X.   Once the solution to (24)-(26) pF,pQ
is  obtained, the equilibrium values of other variables are easily found from the rest of the model.
In  the next section we consider the comparative statics of the system (24)-(26).  The
assumptions  on which this discussion is based are specified in the Appendix.  First, we assume
throughout  that a standard stability assumption is satisfied.  Second, in the case of some of the
results  that are found to be ambiguous in sign, we find that the introduction of a further
assumption yields clear-cut signs.   This further assumption, which is essentially a condition that
direct  impacts of certain parameter changes dominate the indirect repercussions, is specified in
the Appendix, where it is denoted condition (A2).
3. POLICY CHANGES
As  noted in the introduction, the general equilibrium interactions between the operation
of  the credit plan and the control of foreign currency yield effects that contrast sharply with those
generally  found in models of free market economies.  This can be seen from the comparative
statics of the model, which  are set out in Table 1.  The left-hand column shows the parameters
that are  varied, while the top row shows the most important endogenous variables  that may be
affected.   The signs in parentheses are those for which we assume that condition (A2) is satisfied
in order to get a determinate sign.
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
The  first parameter change shown is variation of the amount of working capital  MQ
allowed by the credit plan for the non-traded industrial good sector.  According to the OECD
(1996)  tight credit controls from the end of 1993 provoked a sharp real contraction.  Our model
tends  to support this view, though some signs are indeterminate in this case.  A higher level of
 enables the non-traded industrial good sector to buy more intermediates  ,  thereby raising MQ IQ11
output   Q.   Furthermore, the immediate impact on domestic food output is also positive because
the  terms of trade    facing domestic food producers is improved.  This occurs for two pF/ pQ
reasons.   The first is that the higher level of  Q has a negative impact on price  .   Secondly,  the pQ
higher  level of intermediates imports   is associated with a reduction in imports of food  , IQ A M
and this has a positive impact on the domestic food price  .  pF
Some  indeterminacy arises in the first row of Table 1, however, because of general
equilibrium  repercussions through exports  X.   Since the variations of   and   described above pF pQ
are  in opposite directions, the net effect on the price index  P may be of either sign, as
consequently  is the effect on the money wage rate   in the export sector.   As  X is a function WX
of    ,  we cannot determine the sign of the effect on  X.   Variation of  X has further repercussions, WX
but  as it is unclear which way  X is affected, the signs of the repercussions are also unclear.
Nonetheless,  provided condition (A2) is satisfied, we still have that a greater   is  associated MQ
with  higher levels of the food price   and production  , and with lower levels of food imports  pF AF A M
and  consumption  .   And, regardless of whether (A2) is satisfied, output of the non-traded F d
industrial  good  Q is greater and its price   lower.  However, since the effects on  ,  P and  X pQ WX
are unclear  in sign, we conclude that a policy of credit  restriction of SOEs does not necessarily
lead to a lower price level and  may have indirect effects that limit exports.
The  second row of Table 1 shows the effects of a higher nominal interest rate  r,  a policy
that  has increasingly been used in China in recent years as part of a policy package to try and hold
back  inflation (World Bank, 1996).  In our model, however, a higher   r is associated with a  higher
level  of the price index  P, indicating that anti-inflationary policy might have been more successful
without the interest rate adjustment.   Furthermore, whereas the output of non-traded industrial
goods   Q is
   unaffected
20  (the binding constraint on  Q is the credit plan  ,  which is unchanged), MQ
exports  are reduced because of the higher cost of working capital.  The higher level of  P follows
from  X being smaller: given the balance of trade constraint  ,  fewer food imports   are B ( A M12
allowed  in, causing   and therefore  P to rise.  This also causes the nominal wage rate   to rise, pF WX
further depressing  X,  with repercussions reinforcing those already described.  Since  pF/ pQ
i ncreases, the utility of food producers rises; but, apart from this, the only effects of a higher
nominal  interest rate are harmful.  This macroeconomic argument may be combined with the
microeconomic  rationale given by Zou and Sin (1996) for keeping the nominal interest rate low
in China.
Thirdly,  consider the effects of a monetary expansion in the form of higher initial
household  money holdings  .   The initial impact is that the demands for the two domestically- M o
consumed  goods rise in equal proportions, as, therefore, do the prices   and  .  Hence,  P and  pF pQ WX
also rise, and, because of the latter,   is reduced.   There is then less foreign exchange available X
for  food imports, which are reduced.  This gives a further stimulus to  ,  so that the terms of pF
t rade   rises, causing some increase in domestic food output  ,  though, given the pF/ pQ AF
satisfaction  of the stability condition (A1), this output increase is less than the amount by which
food imports fall.  Thus, as    is unaffected (since   is constant), the greater money supply is Q MQ
associated  with  lower domestic  consumption.  A rise in the budget deficit  D,  through a reduction
in lump-sum taxes  T, has the same qualitative effects.
Part  of the interest in examining the effects of a higher level of   is that this also reveals M o
the  effects of a higher level of the ‘financial discipline’ (or ‘budget hardness’) parameter  .   When ö
 is greater, firms in the non-traded industrial good sector pay banks a larger proportion of what ö
they  owe them. One effect is on the budget deficit  D (see eq.(21)), but, by assumption, the
authorities  respond by setting higher taxes  T to maintain  D.  Also, however, when   is  greater, ö
workers  in this sector are paid a smaller amount,   per head,  ceteris paribus.   The WQ
macroeconomic  effects are qualitatively the same as those of a  reduction in .
21   Hence, the M o
effects  described in the previous paragraph again apply, but in reverse.  Among the benefits of
making   budget constraints harder are that exports and food consumption rise and that the13
aggregate  price level is reduced.  However,  since    declines, food producers suffer a fall pF/ pQ
in utility.
22
The  next parameter change shown in Table 1 is an increase in the exchange rate  e,  i.e.,
devaluation,  a policy that China used in 1994, but is currently reluctant to use again, given the
financial fragility of the region and concerns about the implications for the Hong Kong dollar
(Economist,  1998).  The higher level of   has two immediate effects.  One is that exports   rise. e X
The  other is that, since   is constant, but   increases, SOEs can buy fewer intermediates  , MQ pI IQ
and  therefore their output  Q falls and the price   rises.  These effects improve the balance of pQ
trade  in foreign currency and so more food imports are allowed in, with a negative effect on the
food  price  .   However, with   and   affected in opposite directions, the consequences  for pF pQ pF
the  aggregate price level  ,  and therefore for the nominal wage rate   are unclear. As a result, P WX
the further repercussions on exports  X are unclear  in sign.  Nonetheless, it is found that if (A2)
is  satisfied the overall effects on food imports and food consumption remain positive, while
domestic food output falls.
To  summarize, we have found that for the three sectors in our model, devaluation is either
contractionary  or may be contractionary.  There are two reasons for this, each associated with
government  constraints on market behaviour.  The first is because of the control of food imports.
It  is well known that if, as part of a policy package, import controls are relaxed when devaluation
occurs,  the resulting inflow of imports can be harmful to domestic producers of the good
concerned  (see Cooper, 1971).  The second is because of the role of the credit plan and is specific
to  China.  With credit for SOEs fixed in domestic currency terms, devaluation raises the domestic
currency  price of inputs and so forces SOEs to reduce their output.
23   We conclude  that it may
not be to China’s disadvantage that regional considerations constrain its policy.
24
For  completeness, the effects of exogenous increases in each of the foreign currency prices











lower,  exports rise, so that more food imports are allowed in.  It is straightforward to trace
through  the various repercussions.  Whereas, for example, a higher    has no effect on  Q,  a p
(
X
lower   allows the non-traded industrial good sector to buy more intermediates with its given p
(
I
credit plan   ,  so that  Q  rises.  The effects of a higher foreign currency price of food,  , as MQ p
(
F
shown in the last row of the table, are the same in sign as those of a higher balance of trade
requirement   .   In each case food imports   decline, so that the food price   rises. B ( A M pF
Although  this stimulates food production, it also raises the price index  P.   The money wage rate  WX
therefore rises, causing exports   X to decline.  Thus, a higher balance of trade requirement leads
to a decline in exports.
4. CREDIT RATIONING IN THE EXPORT SECTOR
We have already mentioned in the introduction that during some more severe inflationary
episodes  the authorities have subordinated all other objectives to containing inflation, with credit
rationing  extended to the more dynamic sectors of the economy.  In terms of our model, the
representative  exporting firm then faces a binding credit plan.  This requires only minor
amendment s to our set-up.  All equations in Section 2 still hold, except that   is now MX
interpreted as exogenous and, instead of (16), we have
  (16') LX ’ ( MX/ pI)
1
b
The  exporting firm only takes on the amount of labour that can usefully be combined with
intermediates, and its purchase of intermediates is determined by the credit plan:  . pIIX ’ MX
Equilibrium  condition (26) no longer applies.  To solve the macroeconomic system now we simply
use  (24) and (25) to determine   and  .   The values of all other variables either follow pF pQ
recursively or are independently determined.  For brevity, we consider  here only the three main
amendments that are then required in the comparative statics.
25
First,  there is now an additional policy parameter,  ,  in the model.  The comparative MX15
statics  of variation of   are shown in the first row of Table 2.  A higher level of   enables  MX MX X
to  be greater.  This brings in more foreign exchange, so that food imports   are allowed to rise. A M
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]
The  consequent negative impact on the food price   causes food production   to fall; and pF A F
since    (and  ),  are unaffected, the price index   and the money wage rate   also fall. pQ Q P WX
Hence  a policy of  tightening credit to exporters, in order to hold back the aggregate price, is
mistaken.   Not only does it have the obvious effect of reducing exports, it also has a  positive
effect  on the aggregate price level.  A related policy change is shown in the second row of the
table.   As explained in the Introduction, the authorities in China have sometimes switched credit
to  SOEs from other firms to keep the SOEs afloat.  We represent this in the model by writing
 and consider the effect of variation of   for a given  .    The rationale µ/ MQ/ ( MQ%MX) µ MQ % MX
for  the results in this case has already been given for variations in   and   considered MQ MX
separately.   Not surprisingly, an increase in    causes   and   to fall.  However, since, as µ Q X
already  explained with respect to Table 1,   is unclear in sign, we cannot sign  dP/ dMQ dP/ dµ
without making further restrictions.
Second,  as shown in Table 2, the rate of interest   becomes an entirely impotent policy r
tool.   Since   and   are both constrained by the amount of credit available, the terms on which X Q
the  credit is provided have no effect.  The only other way that   might impinge on the  solution r
to  the model is through its role in the budget deficit.  However, provided taxation   is always set T
such that the target budget deficit   is attained, variation of   has no such affect. D r
Third,  the volume of exports   is now insulated from most policy changes.  Of the X
parameters  listed in Table 1, the variations only of   and   have effects on  .   Since e p
(
I X





devaluation in the regime under consideration.16
5. CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
In  this paper we have attempted to formulate a macro model of the Chinese economy,
taking  into account some of the differences between production sectors in China and paying
particular  attention to monetary policy.  In our basic model we find that a tightening of the credit
plan  has an effect on the aggregate price index that is unclear in sign.  Of course, this does not
indicate  that the policy is necessarily ineffective; but it does suggest that in the Chinese
institutional framework such a policy should be used with care.  And  we find that the extension
of  binding credit controls to the export sector should be avoided because there is then a clear-cut
positive effect on the aggregate price index.
We also  find that another commonly used tool of monetary policy in China, interest rate
variation,  has the opposite of the desired effect.  Given the institutional framework of the credit
plan,  a higher nominal interest rate is associated with a higher aggregate price index (though if
credit  controls are extended to the export sector, interest rate variation has no significant effects).
Money  is not neutral in the model.  Consider an increase in the money supply in the form
of higher initial money holdings for households.  This has the same macroeconomic effects as
when an increased  allocation of working capital to SOEs is distributed by the SOEs directly to
workers,  rather than used for buying intermediates.  The price index therefore rises, but the effects
on  outputs are mixed.  The output of SOEs is unaffected, whereas exporters produce less and
food production rises.   We also examine an increase in financial discipline in the form of SOEs
honouring  a larger proportion of their debt obligations.  This has effects that are opposite in sign
to  those of an increase in initial money holdings by households.   Since the aggregate price index
therefore  falls, this indicates that the hardening of budget constraints is an effective anti-
inflationary device.  An  added bonus, through general equilibrium repercussions, is that exports
increase.   Devaluation, however, is of rather doubtful benefit in the model.  It has an unclear effect
on  exports and the price index, while causing SOEs to reduce output; and the effect on food17
production  is likely to be negative.
26   Furthermore, if credit rationing is extended to the export
sector, devaluation causes exports to fall.
Finally,  notice that a characteristic feature of the model is that policy changes that lower
the  price index and raise exports tend to reduce welfare in the agricultural sector.  (Agricultural
welfare  is positively related to the terms of trade   and so also to output  .)   Since poverty pF/ pQ AF
in  China is largely concentrated in the agricultural sector (World Bank, 1997) this indicates a
significant conflict facing policy-makers.18
APPENDIX
The Basic Model
Differentiating (24) - (26) totally we obtain a system of the form








where  the  ’s  are the numerical values of the partial derivatives attached to the endogenous kij
variables    and   (i.e.,  ).   The rows of the matrix of partial derivatives dpF ,dpQ dX kij>0￿ i ,j
correspond,  respectively, to (24) - (26).  On the r.h.s.,   is the column vector of differentials of dz
parameters listed in Table 1; and   is the corresponding matrix of partial derivatives.   Kz
The determinant of the   -matrix is kij
  (A1) Ä / &k11 k22 k33 % k13 k31 k22
For the stability  of the system it is sufficient to assume that  < 0.  The signs in Table 1 that are Ä
not  in parentheses then follow immediately.  For the signs in parentheses we further assume that
   (A2) k22 k33 / p
(
F & ( k12 k33 %k13 k32 ) / p
(
I > 0
Our  sign assumptions are essentially that direct partial derivatives dominate indirect partial
derivatives.
Credit Rationing in the Export Sector
As explained in the  text, the introduction of credit rationing in the export sector enables









where    and   are the appropriately amended forms of    and  ,  respectively.  The K
)
z dz ) Kz dz
corresponding stability condition is
(A3) Ä) / k11 k22> 0
(A3) is satisfied without the need for further assumptions. 19
NOTES
1 See, e.g. Allsopp (1995) or World Bank (1995).
2 For  general discussions of the credit plan see Montes-Negret (1995) and World Bank
(1995).   State commercial banks have repeatedly found new ways to circumvent the credit
plan  by disguising their lending, and there has been a steady growth of non-bank financial
intermediaries (World Bank,  1996).  Nonetheless the credit plan retains its pre-eminent
role in monetary policy.
3 A recent official (i.e. conservative) estimate puts the proportion at 22% (Economist,
1997).
4 This  three-sector framework is also used in Bennett and Dixon (1996).  There, however,
we  model dual-track pricing and urban goods rationing.  Here, we suppress such
considerations  and elaborate on the monetary side.  It is worth noting that urban rationing
is  now much less prevalent, though it has not disappeared completely (see Gao, Wailes
and Cramer, 1996).
5 This  is the key constraint that drives the determination of equilibrium for the whole
economy  in the model.  In contrast, in Bennett and Dixon (1996) the critical factor is the
availability  of imported intermediates, which is limited by the balance of trade constraint.
6 This happened, for example, in early 1996 (see Sachs and Woo, 1997).
7 This formulation is explained in more detail in our earlier paper.  20
8 According  to the World Bank (1997) the main factor limiting migration to towns and
cities  may be the difficulty migrants have in qualifying for urban welfare facilities.  Also,
if  a household is absent from its village it may lose its chance to be allocated agricultural
land.
9 SOEs  now produce about 1/3 of industrial output and account for about 2/3 of urban
employment (World Bank, 1997).
10 For simplicity, we use the terms ‘household’ and ‘employee’ interchangeably.   In China
family members tend to all work in the same enterprise, so our mixing of the terms may
be of little consequence.
11 In  practice, more than 95% of industrial output is now sold at market prices (World Bank,
1997).
12 The  model might be reformulated on the assumption that   is endogenous.  If the ö
employees  of SOEs find that their income   is going to decline, they may be willing to WQ
risk  greater conflict with the authorities by honouring less of their debt obligation
(reducing  ).  As a stylized representation of this case, suppose they choose   so  that ö ö
 always reaches a given target level.  For a given value of   it turns out that none WQ TQ
of  our macroeconomic results are affected by this change to the model.  The reason for
this  is that only income distribution is affected, and, given utility function (1),
distributional changes have no effects on the macro equilibrium.
13 In  1995 86% of China’s merchandise exports were manufactures (World Bank, 1997, p.
128).
14 Almost half of all Chinese imports are processed to go to export (World Bank, 1996).21
15 Because  our formulation of the labour market (see below) entails an infinitely elastic
labour  supply in the relevant region, we need diminishing returns to labour in eq. (13) for
there to be a unique employment equilibrium.
16 We might also incorporate joint ventures with foreign companies into the model by
assuming  that a portion of export sector profit goes to foreigners.  This would introduce
various  indeterminacies into our results because exports and profit outflows would be
positively  related, having conflicting effects on foreign currency flows and therefore
having repercussions that are unclear in sign.
17 Currently, China imports about 5% of its grain needs (World Bank, 1997).
18 Here, and  throughout, we economize on notation by writing aggregate variables for the
two industrial sectors as if there were only one firm in each sector.
19 It  might also appear that the losses of the SOE-sector should be added into (22).
However,  allowing for the possible non-payment of some debt, the SOE-sector breaks
even by definition because all surplus is distributed to workers.
20 Since    is constant, so too is  .   This is because with utility function (1) domestic Q pQ
demands are isoelastic in own price (see (23)).
21 Conversely,  as was noted in Section 3, when part of   is distributed directly to workers MQ
(ins tead of being used to buy intermediates)   is thereby increased.  The WQ
macroeconomic effects are qualitatively the same as those of an increase in  . M o
22 If    is held constant when  increases,   is fixed at a lower level.   As we have already T ö D
seen, this has the same qualitative effects as a fall in   does. Mo22
23 A corresponding effect in a market economy is that devaluation may force up the interest
rate  because it reduces the real volume of credit.  The interest rate rise then has
contractionary effects (see van Wijnbergen, 1986).
24 Empirical evidence on the effects of Chinese devaluations is contradictory: see Brada,
Kutan  and Zhou (1993) and Turay (1995).  In our earlier model (Bennett and Dixon,
1995)  we did not allow for credit controls or food imports and so are found that
devaluation was expansionary. 
25 In  the comparative statics of the reformulated model there are no signs that are the reverse
of those shown in Table 1.
26 In  contrast, in our 1996 paper we found that devaluation reduces price variables and
increases  quantity variables.  However, that paper was concerned primarily with fiscal
matters.   It did not take into account the critical roles played by the credit plan and
working capital in the Chinese economy.23
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Table 1:  Comparative Statics26
parameters
endogenous variables
pF pQ WX, P X Q A M AF F d
MX - 0 - + 0 + - +
? - ? - 0 - ? ? µ
r 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 2: Modification of the Credit Plan